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Abstract: In contemporary Russia there is widespread support for the death 
penalty. Recent Russian presidents have endorsed the nation’s entry into the 
European Community (EC). The dilemma is that the price of membership into 
the EC is total abolition of capital punishment. The Russian Duma is much less 
popular than the president, even though it sides with public opinion in 
supporting capital punishment. Since 1997, these conflicting political positions 
have been temporarily neutralized by leaving capital punishment legislation in 
place but allowing the Russian president to offer clemency to all sentenced to 
death. In 1999, the Constitutional Court of Russia placed a moratorium on all 
death sentences until jury trials are re-introduced throughout the nation. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In 1996, the Russian Federation introduced a de facto 
moratorium on the death penalty in an effort to gain membership in 
the Council of Europe (CE) and to gain full integration into the 
European community after the breakdown of the USSR. Yet, thirteen 
years later, Russia is the only member of the CE that signed, but 
refused to ratify, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention of Human 
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Rights (ECHR). Protocol No. 6 is a major legal instrument intended to 
create a death penalty-free European community. The de facto 
moratorium in Russia consists of numerous legal documents such as 
the Criminal Code (CC) of Russia, the Criminal Execution Code (CEC) 
of Russia, the Russian Constitution, various Presidential Decrees, and 
the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Different political 
actors and institutions with contradictory agendas are involved. They 
include supporters of the death penalty, such as the State Duma, as 
well as the majority of the Russian population and opponents of capital 
punishment that comprise the Russian President and the Parliament 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), with the Constitutional 
Court of Russia1 holding the middle ground.  
 
The application of symbolic law theory to death penalty politics 
can provide insight into legislative acts that were previously considered 
“irrational” or chaotic and can better explain the dynamics of political 
actors (Edelman, 1971; Gaylord & Galliher, 1994; Gusfield, 1963). 
Symbolic law can have its impact by merely being on the statute books 
without actually being enforced. Pioneering research on symbolic law 
theory by Gusfield (1963) describes American alcohol prohibition as a 
means of satisfying protestant forces, epitomized by the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), who felt threatened by Roman 
Catholic immigrant groups and their rapidly increasing numbers. These 
immigrant groups consumed alcohol and they seemed to be usurping 
Protestant political dominance. The solution to the problem was the 
passage of a national alcohol prohibition, which proclaimed that the 
Protestant way of life was superior. However, the prohibition was 
unenforced, allowing Catholic drinkers to continue their customary 
consumption. Similarly, Edelman (1971) found unenforced symbolic 
law to be a means of achieving agreement between parties with 
contradictory economic interests. Edelman draws on the example of 
the anti-trust legislation of early 20th century America. While the 
American public demanded control over the monopolistic practices of 
corporations, the powerful corporations wanted to be left alone to 
pursue maximum profits. Accordingly, anti-trust legislation was 
enacted, appeasing the masses, but was not enforced, thus satisfying 
corporate leaders. More to the point of the death penalty, Gaylord and 
Galliher (1994) found that unenforced death penalty legislation 
stretching over several decades in Hong Kong was a means of 
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attempting to mollify both the local Chinese population, which 
demanded this severe punishment, and the British government, which 
had ultimate legal authority that eschewed capital punishment. Local 
Hong Kong courts continued to sentence convicted murderers to death 
only to have the executions blocked by British authorities. In the light 
of the above examples, we seek here to explain unenforced death 
penalty legislation in contemporary Russia by using the symbolic 
theory of law.  
 
2. Brief History of the Death Penalty in Russia  
 
The use of the death penalty in Russian politics has a long 
history. According to existing historic accounts, the death penalty in 
ancient Russia originated as a tribal vengeance for the crime of murder 
in the early 5th century (Malinovskyi, 1908). In the 11th century tribal 
vengeance was prohibited by the Grand Prince in an effort to weaken 
the tribes. Instead, the death penalty became a prerogative of the 
state and was repeatedly used for political oppression during the 11th-
12th century (Budzinskyi, 1870; Tagantsev, 1912; Zagoskin, 1892).2 
Between the 14th and 16th centuries, the death penalty was 
introduced as an official punishment for crimes against the Grand 
Prince, crimes against the church and the state, for crimes of murder, 
and for some property offences (Adams, 1970; Kistyakovskyi, 1967; 
Mikhlin, 1997; Ponomarev & Mikhlin, 1995).3  
 
In the 17th and 18th centuries the death penalty became 
instrumental for the politics of expansionist Russian monarchs. 
Executions were used by Ivan The Terrible and then by Peter The 
Great to strengthen and centralize their power and to defeat their 
political opponents (Moutchnik, 2006; Zagoskin, 1892).4 During these 
periods, the number of capital offences increased and especially 
barbaric execution styles were often selected by the Tsar to produce 
the highest levels of fear among his subjects (Adams, 1970). Whereas 
the Court Code (Sudebnoe Ulozhenie) of 1649 introduced by Tsar 
Alexei Mikhailovich listed 63 crimes punishable by over 12 types of 
methods, the Military Articles (Voinskie Artikuly) of 1715 created by 
Peter The Great had already listed 123 capital offences and over 20 
execution styles (Sergeevskyi, 1887). Under Chapters 1-3, 21-22 and 
25 of the Court Code of 1649, capital punishment was prescribed for 
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all crimes against the state and the Tsar, crimes against church, and 
the crimes of murder, rape, and selling tobacco (Shargorodskyi, 
1957). The Military Articles of 1715 added new crimes punishable by 
death including 13 new types of treason, interference with the 
administration of justice and the delivery of state mail, cutting down 
trees in the parks belonging to the Tsar, dueling, sodomy, and robbery 
(Kistyakovskyi, 1896). Nevertheless, only fifty years later, the 
Instructions of Catherine the Great (Nakaz, 1767) not only declared 
disapproval for the death penalty in general, but they also stated that 
the death penalty does not serve the purposes of deterrence and 
rehabilitation5 (Feldshtein, 1909). Historians agree that the 
Instructions did not have any practical meaning and that they were 
mostly just considered a declaration of royal intentions and a sign of 
the royal family’s adherence to the standards of the enlightenment 
(Shargorodskyi, 1957).  
 
It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
Russia took practical steps in limiting the use of the death penalty. In 
1864, for the first time in Russia the Regulations of the Criminal 
Proceedings (Ustav Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva) offered provisions 
for the appeal and pardon of death sentences (Rozin, 1913). In 1903, 
the new Criminal Code (Ugolovnoe Ulozhenie) eliminated the use of 
the death penalty for juveniles, the elderly, and female offenders 
(Sergeevskyi, 1910). The list of military laws of the 1870s-1880s that 
allowed the death penalty for non-capital crimes when committed 
during a declared state of emergency was also seriously truncated 
during 1902-1903 (Gordon et al., 1911; Rawson, 1984). In 1906, the 
first Russian parliament (Gosudarstvennaya Duma) attempted to 
abolish the death penalty for all crimes, including military and state 
offences. The draft of this law was unanimously approved by the lower 
chamber of the Duma on June 19 of 1906, but failed at the State 
Council, the upper chamber of the parliament (Mikhlin, 1997). The 
second Russian Duma drafted a proposal on death penalty abolition in 
1907 but was dismissed before it was able to adopt the proposal 
(Nethercott, 2007). The third Duma sent the proposal to the legislative 
commission for further discussion, but decided against it in the end 
(Gernet 1913).6 In all three Dumas the proposals to abolish the death 
penalty were drafted by a coalition of the socialist, constitutional-
democratic, and labor parties, which suggests that both left and 
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centrist political forces in the early 20th century were united in the 
effort against the death penalty. However, on all three occasions, the 
conservative right, the executive government, and the royal family 
successfully blocked such attempts, justifying the need for the death 
penalty by pointing to spreading political crimes and instabilities 
(Adams, 1970). In his 1913 book, Gernet noticed that such a political 
situation around the death penalty issue was not unique to Russia. 
Reactionary political forces in power tended to advocate for the death 
penalty, even when the general population did not always support 
such views (Spasovich, 1863). Leading criminologists in late imperial 
Russia, who predominantly supported the abolition of the death 
penalty, suggested that the death penalty was used in the Russian 
Empire by conservatives as an instrument of "regime protection" when 
other means of securing its legitimacy were failing (Tagantsev, 1913; 
Viktorskii, 1912).  
 
During the five years following the February revolution of 1917, 
the legislation on the death penalty in Russia was constantly changing. 
It was repeatedly abolished and then reinstated by both the 
Provisional7 and Bolshevik governments. Just a month after the 
February revolution of 1917, the Provisional government abolished 
capital punishment for all criminal offences (Browder & Kerensky, 
1961). The new Provisional government declared that the death 
penalty was an ineffective reactionary measure previously used by the 
conservative Tsar government and therefore should be abolished in 
the light of a new doctrine of revolutionary Russia (Browder & 
Kerensky, 1961). However, four months later, on July 12th of 1917, 
the death penalty was restored for all military crimes, murder, rape, 
and offences against the state committed during war time (Browder & 
Kerensky, 1961). This measure was adopted by the Provisional 
government as a result of the deteriorating political and economic 
situation in Russia due to its unsuccessful participation in WWI and 
associated civil disturbances (Naumov, 2002). Yet, in September of 
1917, the Provisional government declared a moratorium on the use of 
the death penalty (Adams, 1970). Thus the struggle of the Provisional 
government with the issue of the death penalty was common. The 
Provisional government was torn apart by the contradictions between 
an ideological and populist need to abolish the death penalty and the 
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fear of growing political opposition that was attempting to take over 
the country.  
 
After the Bolshevik’s coup d’etat, also known as the Red October 
Revolution of 1917, the death penalty was again abolished in October 
of 19178 as “a bourgeois measure contradicting the revolutionary 
consciousness of the socialist proletariat” (Belyaev & Shargorodskyi, 
1970, p. 23). Yet four months later, on February 21 of 1918, it was 
reinstated by the Decree-declaration titled “Socialist Motherland is in 
Danger!” (Estrin, 1935). The Decree was adopted in response to the 
exigencies of a civil war and foreign intervention experienced by 
Russia during 1917-1919. The Decree authorized the extrajudicial 
“Emergency Commissions” to sentence the offenders who committed 
counter-revolutionary crimes, such as sabotage and treason, without 
trial or appeal (Estrin, 1935). A new Decree adopted on June 16 of 
1918 also instructed the Revolutionary People’s Courts9 to use the 
death penalty as the only punishment for counter-revolutionary 
offences (Mikhlin 1997). Finally, in September of 1918, the Decree 
called “About Red Terror”10 directed that “all persons having links with 
White Guard organizations,11 or involved in conspiracies and revolts” 
were subject to immediate shooting based on decisions adopted by the 
Emergency Commissions, which allowed extrajudicial and immediate 
application of the death penalty (Feldbrugge, 1964). Based on these 
documents, the Bolshevik government launched an unprecedented 
campaign of violence resulting in both judicial and extrajudicial 
applications of the death penalty in Russia to more than 12,000 people 
during 1917-1920 (Naumov, 2002). Even the official Soviet statistics 
admit that at least 766 people were executed on the basis of judicial 
decisions of the Revolutionary tribunals between 1918 and 1920 
(Juviler, 1976). This is almost twice as many people who were 
sentenced to the death penalty by the Tsarist government between 
1876 and 1905 (Gernet 1906).12 Soviet historians justified the massive 
use of the death penalty by Bolsheviks during 1917-1919 in 
accordance with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism ideology. They 
pointed out that it was the only available means to "reduce, localize 
and simplify the blood-thirsty agony of the old society and the bloody 
birth of the new society" (Shargorodskyi, 1958, p. 64). 
On January 17, 192013, the death penalty was abolished again 
since “the enemies of the Red Revolution were defeated in most 
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territories of Soviet Russia” (Piontkovskyi, Romashkin, & Chkhikvadze, 
1970, p. 18). However, the Decree of 1920 allowed the use of the 
death penalty by the military tribunals and also provided a justification 
for the possible use of the death penalty in the future. The decree 
stated that "only renewed attempts . . . to disturb the steady position 
of Soviet power ... by armed interventions or material support of . . . 
Tsarist generals can force the Soviet Government to revert again to 
terrorist methods" (Kucherov, 1970, p. 67). In the mid-1920s Soviet 
Russia entered a period called the New Economic Policy (NEP)14, and 
adopted two new Criminal Codes (CC) in 1922 and in 1926. The first 
CC of 1922 was an initial attempt to codify existing Soviet laws since 
1917. Debates preceding the adoption of this document were focused, 
among other things, on whether the death penalty should be used in 
the new "classless" society. The drafts of the CC prepared by the 
Peoples Commissariat for Justice (Narkomyust) and the Institute of 
Soviet Law argued for the removal of the death penalty from the 
measures of criminal punishment since the enemies of the Red 
Revolution were no longer threatening the existence of the Soviet 
state (Gerzenzon, Gringauz, Durmanov, Isaev, & Utevskyi, 1948).15 
However, these views were thought to be erroneous and dangerous 
and the abolition of the death penalty was rejected by the "special 
commission" of the Small Council of People's Commissars (Malyi 
Sovnarkom) (Kuznetsov, 2002; Timasheff, 1953). As a compromise, 
the death penalty in the CC of 1922 was listed as a temporary and 
exceptional measure, a tradition that was later followed by all Soviet 
codes. The CC of 1922 allowed the death penalty in the form of 
shooting for 19 separate crimes, most of which were offences against 
the state (Zakhartsev, 2004).16 However, in 13 out 19 capital crimes, 
according to the CC of 1922, the judges had full discretion to replace 
the death sentence with only five years of imprisonment (Kuznetsov, 
2002). The focus of the CC of 1922 was mostly rehabilitative, which 
diminished the use of the death penalty by the courts (Solomon, 
1980).  
 
The Constitution of the USSR, enacted in 1924, transferred the 
general principles of criminal law from the constituent Republics to the 
Union (Timasheff, 1953). This fact, together with the numerous 
imperfections of the CC of 1922, became an impetus for the 
development of new all-Soviet criminal codes, including the 
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Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law of USSR of 1924 and the new 
CC of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)17 of 1926 
(Zakhartsev, 2004). The new Code was adopted in 1926 and it 
retained capital punishment for all political crimes, but reduced the 
number of other capital offences (Krylenko 1934).18 Both The 
Principles of 1924 and the CC of 1926 continued to declare that capital 
punishment was an exceptional measure temporarily restored only for 
the protection of the state and the people, and that it should be used 
only until its abolition by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
(Butler, 1999).19 Despite this declaration, capital punishment was not 
abolished in the USSR. The end of the NEP period in the late 1920s 
marked a new era of political repression.  
 
In the late 1920s the Politburo of the Communist party inserted 
itself in the judicial process to exercise significant political control over 
penal policy and proceedings resulting in the death penalty. The 
Special Commission for Political Cases was created in 1928 by the 
Politburo to oversee indictments of political importance where death 
penalty sentences were possible (Khlevniuk, 1997). Between 1929 and 
1940, the CC of RSFSR of 1926 was supplemented by a number of 
new capital political offences. In 1929, amendments to the CC of 
RSFSR of 192620 provided that officials who defect or take bribes while 
in office should be treated equally with the perpetrators of crimes 
against the state and sentenced to death (Berman, 1972). In 1932, 
the Decree on “Socialistic property”21 directed the People’s Courts that 
a theft of goods transported by rail or water as well as a theft from 
collective farms or cooperative property should be considered counter-
revolutionary crimes and could be punished by the death penalty 
(Berman, 1972). In 1934, the crimes against the state were 
supplemented by a notoriously known capital offence named the 
“betrayal of the Motherland”22 (Ponomarev & Mikhlin, 1995). The 
principle of analogy23 was allowed when applying these provisions, 
which made it possible to include all conceivable activities against the 
state and regular crimes under the umbrella of the “betrayal of the 
Motherland” offence (Feldbrugge, 1973). During World War II (WWII), 
the principle of analogy was also responsible for the criminal 
prosecution of numerous acts, which previously seemed harmless or of 
minor danger, without requiring amendment of the Criminal Code 
(Hazard, 1948). According to the official statistics between 1921 and 
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1953, 790 thousand people were executed for the counter-
revolutionary offences by both judicial and extrajudicial agencies 
(Kuznetsov, 2002). However, many historians believe that the actual 
number of those executed is much higher and that Stalin’s political 
repressions were responsible for the execution of millions of innocent 
people (Ponomarev & Mikhlin, 1995).  
 
A new attempt to abolish the death penalty in respect to crimes 
committed during peacetime was undertaken in 1947. The abolition 
was intended to mark the “victorious conclusion of WWII by the 
glorious people of Soviet Union” and was introduced by Stalin without 
the consent of Soviet jurists or the leading criminal law scholars 
(Solomon, 1978).24 The death penalty was substituted, according to 
this Decree by 25 years in prison (Piontkovskyi et al., 1970). In 1950, 
the death penalty was restored again for offences against the state, 
including treason, “betrayal of the Motherland,” and espionage 
(Belyaev & Shargorodskyi, 1970). The new CC of RSFSR was adopted 
in 1960 as a result of “the Kruschev thaw”25. This code banned the 
principle of analogy and eliminated the notorious “betrayal of the 
Motherland” crime. At the same time, the new criminal code 
contributed significantly to the expansion of the death penalty in 
Russia by adding new crimes to the list of capital offences 
(Kistyakovskyi, 1967). The CC of RSFSR (1960) included the death 
penalty for all state crimes, a murder committed under aggravated 
circumstances, felonies committed during war time, and selected 
property crimes such as money counterfeiting, unauthorized dealing of 
foreign currency, and aggravated robbery by an organized group 
(Belyaev & Shargorodskyi, 1970; Solomon, 1978). There were more 
than 30 capital offences in the CC of RSFSR of 1960 despite the fact 
that the death penalty was still declared an exceptional measure of 
punishment by the general part of the CC of RSFSR.  
 
Starting from the mid-1980s, many capital offences were 
gradually excluded from the CC of RSFSR, leaving only a few crimes 
against the state and crimes against persons. By the end of the 1980s, 
the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty according to the 
CC of RSFSR decreased to 24 (Naumov, 2002). In 1991, only 16 
capital offences were listed in the CC of RSFSR, five of which were 
related to crimes against persons (Kudryavtsev & Naumov, 1997). 
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Based on the available data, the number of defendants executed in the 
Soviet Union for crimes against the state gradually decreased since the 
mid-1970s. In 1962-1963, Berg estimated that about 2,200 people 
were annually executed in the Soviet Union for first-degree murder 
(Berg, 1985). At the same time, Mikhlin asserted that only 116 people 
were executed by the Russian Federation in 1998 (2000). In the late 
1980s, Soviet scholars and jurists were actively discussing the new 
direction of long needed criminal law reform. Accordingly, the Model 
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation and the Model Penal 
Code were drafted in 1985 and 1986 in an effort to reform the existing 
criminal law. These documents were never enacted, but they created a 
meaningful discussion on the major points of criminal law reform 
including the abolition of the death penalty in the late Soviet Union. 
Some authors of these drafts, such as Karelina and Sakarov were 
adamant opponents of capital punishment. However, faced with 
overwhelming public and scholarly support for the death penalty, they 
did not include the idea of abolition in either the Principles or the 
Criminal Code (Solomon, 1992). Instead, both documents supported 
an idea of limited death penalty application, available only for crimes 
against the state and the most heinous crimes against persons. The 
deep scholarly divide on the matter of the death penalty continued 
until the adoption of the new CC of Russia in 1996, with a large group 
of scholars arguing for the death penalty.26 This historic overview 
illustrates that both the adoption and abolition of death penalty 
through the Russian history was not a question of mere instrumental 
necessity. Instead, it can be argued that death penalty law was used 
by both Tsars and Soviet leaders to communicate various messages to 
existing political agents. The processes of strengthening the 
government's authority were usually related in Russia to the adoption 
or expansion of death penalty laws, whereas the historic moments of 
liberalization and enlightenment can be connected to the attempts of 
death penalty abolition.  
 
Available data on death penalty sentences and executions in 
Russia is scarce and contradictory. It is unclear how many people were 
executed in Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union between the 1920s 
and the mid-1950s. Pristavkin, the adviser to the President of Russia 
and the head of the Clemency Commission27 (Pristavkin, 2004), 
asserted that approximately 20,000 were executed in the Soviet Union 
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for criminal activities each year between 1920 and 1954.28 Data 
provided by Berg give some indication of death penalty executions in 
the Soviet Union during 1960s, but are also incomplete and based on a 
regional data set only (1985). His estimations suggest that at least 
2,200 people were executed annually during the early 1960s in the 
Soviet Union (Berg, 1985).  
 
The most comprehensive data about death sentences and 
executions in Russia for the last 37 years was provided by Mikhlin 
(2000). He used official statistics on executions provided by the 
Russian Ministry of Corrections and revealed that for the last four 
decades the number of executions performed in the Soviet Union was 
reduced from 2159 people in 1962 to 116 people in 1998. Data 
provided by Barry and Williams (1997) corroborates tendencies 
reported my Mikhlin, but offers a different number for executions 
conducted between 1985 and 1990. Barry and Williams suggest that 
770 individuals were executed in the Soviet Union in 1985, and by the 
year of 1990, the number of executions dropped to 195. Since 1999, 
official statistics from the Russian Ministry of Justice show that no 
person was executed or sentenced to death. Nevertheless, the use of 
official statistics to estimate the scope of executions in the Soviet 
Union and Russia is problematic. The official Soviet and Russian 
statistics are known to have fundamental flaws, since they are 
manipulated for the purpose of plausible reports (Skomorokhov & 
Shikhanov, 2006). In the absence of other available data, researchers 
have to use the official statistics for death penalty executions in Russia 
but should exercise caution over their reliability (Terrill, 1997).  
 
3. Looking West: The Death penalty under the 
Current Criminal Law in Russia29  
 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the attitudes 
of ruling political elites towards the death penalty in Russia have 
undergone significant change. Many of the “new democrats”30 
considered capital punishment an atrocity of the totalitarian past and 
were ready to abolish it. Thus, in the early 1990s the death penalty 
was often viewed as a temporary measure that would be discontinued 
in the very near future (Ignatov & Krasikov, 1999). This vision was 
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reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 
1993.  
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is 
one of the most prominent opponents of the death penalty in Europe. 
In 1980, this organization appealed to the members of the Council of 
Europe (CE) with a declaration to abolish the death penalty in the 
entire territory of Europe. In 1983, Protocol No. 6 to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was created to eliminate the death 
penalty in Western Europe; it was signed by the 21 members of the 
CE. With time, the ratification of Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR became a 
necessary condition for membership in the CE (Barry & Williams 
1997). In the effort to integrate into the European community, in 1992 
Russia applied for membership in the Council of Europe. On January 
25, 1996, membership was granted pending ratification of Protocol No. 
6 by Russia within the next three years.31 In Opinion # 193, the PACE 
declared that it was an understanding of the European community that 
Russia, as a member of the CE, would accept the international 
obligation to ratify Protocol No. 6.  
 
In accordance with this international obligation, the President of 
Russia issued Decree # 724 “On the gradual decrease of the 
application of the death penalty in connection with accession to the 
CE.”32 President Yeltsin instructed the government of Russia to prepare 
and introduce a bill to the State Duma, which allowed Russia to sign 
and ratify Protocol No. 6. The appropriate draft was prepared by the 
government by the end of 1996, but was never passed by the State 
Duma.33  
 
But also in 1996, the State Duma adopted a new Criminal Code 
of Russia (CC of Russia), which recognized the death penalty as one of 
the possible criminal punishments. Article 58 of the CC of Russia 
allowed the death sentence for five capital offences, all of which 
pertained to crimes against life (Butler, 1999).34 What is more 
important, the CC of Russia of 1996 provided an opportunity to replace 
the death penalty by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of 
25 years if clemency is granted.35 According to the Constitution of 
Russia (1993), the only person who can grant clemency in such cases 
is the President of Russia.36 The President created the Commission on 
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Pardon and Amnesty to process the clemency requests.37 In order to 
bring the current penal law in accordance with the new CC of Russia, 
the new Criminal Executive Code of Russia (CEC of Russia) was 
adopted in 1997. Provisions in articles 184-186 of the CEC of Russia 
allowed the execution of the death sentence only after the President of 
Russia denied the defendant’s application for clemency.38 The 
combined provisions of these three documents—the Constitution of 
Russia, the CC of Russia of 1996, and the CEC of Russia of 1997—
created a situation where the death penalty was at least partially de 
facto abolished, as long as the President of Russia granted clemency to 
all defendants sentenced to death.39 In the absence of a binding 
directive to the Commission on Pardon and Amnesty, this situation still 
allowed the courts, at least theoretically, to carry out existing death 
penalty sentences, which made this de facto abolition incomplete.  
 
The de facto partial abolition did not preclude Russia from 
executing convicted individuals after 1996. According to Report 
#7746, presented on January 28, 1997, PACE received a confirmation 
“that in the first half of 1996, at least 53 executions were carried out 
in Russia, in flagrant violation of the commitment entered into by the 
country upon accession to the Council of Europe to put into place a 
moratorium on executions immediately”.40 Based on this report, on 
January 29, 1997, the PACE adopted Resolution # 1111, which 
condemned Russia’s actions and “warn[ed] the Russian authorities that 
it [would] take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with 
commitments entered into… The Assembly may consider the non-
ratification of the credentials of the Russian parliamentary delegation 
at its next session”. 41  
 
In response to this criticism, on February 27, 1997 the president 
of Russia issued an order instructing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
sign Protocol No. 6. In compliance with this Order, Protocol No. 6 was 
signed by Russia on April 16, 1997 in Strasburg. At the same time, a 
group of pro-presidential representatives introduced a bill in the State 
Duma to declare a three-year moratorium on executions.42 In the 
explanatory note to the bill the representatives argued that due to a 
high number of judicial errors and miscarriages of justice in Russia, 
and under international obligations of Protocol No. 6, it was the duty of 
the State Duma to declare a legislative moratorium on the 
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executions.43 The bill was defeated by the State Duma with only 75 out 
of 257 representatives voting for it. Both communist and centrist 
political parties opposed the bill as “a document that does not reflect 
on the current Russian reality, where the crime rates are drastically 
increasing every year” (Pozdnov, 2003, p. 50). No word was made of 
PACE obligations during this defeat.  
 
Soon after that, on January 8, 1998, new amendments were 
introduced to the provisions of articles 184-185 of the CEC of Russia.44 
These amendments allowed the President of Russia to pardon 
defendants sentenced to death, even if these defendants did not apply 
for clemency. This situation is sometimes described as a complete de 
facto abolition of the death penalty (Pozdnov, 2003). In 1999, the 
president of Russia made another attempt to abolish the death 
penalty. On August 6, 1999, he introduced a draft of a bill that entirely 
abolished the death penalty in Russia.45 The bill was again defeated by 
the State Duma. The Duma made it impossible for Russia to ratify 
Protocol No. 6, which had been signed in 1997.  
 
That same year, a third player was introduced into the conflict 
between the Russian parliament and the President of Russia. The 
Constitutional Court of Russia46 decided to contribute to the death 
penalty debate by issuing a ruling on February 2, 1999.47 In its ruling 
the Constitutional Court asserted that article 20 of the Russian 
Constitution guarantees a jury trial for every defendant who could face 
a death sentence. Since by 1999, the jury option in most of the 
regions was not available, the Constitutional Court ruled that the use 
of the death penalty in Russia is currently unconstitutional. The 
Constitutional Court also stated that the death penalty could not be 
applied even in the nine regions of Russia where the jury trials existed 
by 1999 because this would violate the principle of equal protection 
(Barry, 2002). The possibility of jury trials in all Russian regions was 
introduced by the new Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) adopted in 
December, 2001.48 However, due to both organizational and financial 
difficulties, it was decided that jury trials would not be established 
simultaneously through the entire territory of Russia. In 2002, Russia 
had few judges who had any experience working with jury trials. 
Moreover, most of the courts had no funding and no experience 
dealing with the process of jury selection including the creation of 
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venire and voir dire. The Statute “On the effect of CPC of Russia of 
2001”49 provided that jury trials would resume in nine regions of 
Russian starting July 2002; in 62 regions starting January 2003; in 
thirteen regions starting July 2003; in four regions starting January 
2004; and in one region, Chechen Republic, starting January 2007. In 
2006, the State Duma extended the deadline to introduce jury trials in 
Chechen Republic until January, 2010.50 As of now, jury trials exist in 
all regions of Russia except the Chechen Republic. Beginning in 2010, 
the Russian courts can again sentence defendants to death. However, 
existing provisions of Articles 184-185 of the CEC of Russia (1997) still 
allow the President to pardon every defendant sentenced to death. 
Since Russia is a Presidential Republic, the Presidential pardon will 
take over the court's prerogative. Thus the Russian Federation remains 
the only country out of 46 CE members who signed, but has not 
ratified the Protocol No. 6. Since 1997, fourteen former Soviet-bloc 
countries have signed and ratified this Protocol.  
 
4. Attitudes and Reactions to the Death Penalty in 
Russia: People, the State Duma, and the 
President  
 
4.1. The Public51  
 
According to the available data, most Russians express 
overwhelming support for the death penalty.52 Since the late 1980s, 
when Glasnost53 was declared the principle of new post-Soviet Russia, 
a number of research companies have been allowed to measure public 
opinion on the death penalty. The first known study was conducted by 
the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Research (VCIOM) in 1989. It 
revealed that 62% of all Russians believed that the application of the 
death penalty should be continued and even extended beyond the 
existing capital offences (the Foundation of Public Opinion, (FOM, 
1997a)). Five years later, 65% of respondents in a representative 
sample of Russia agreed that the death penalty should be used and 
only 5% of Russians thought that capital punishment should be 
immediately abolished (VCIOM, 1994).  
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In 1997, according to a study by FOM, 70% of all Russians 
continued to think that the capital punishment should be used (FOM, 
1997c). The study also discovered that 55% of all Russians thought 
that the moratorium declared on the death penalty in 1996 was a 
mistake, and 63% of all Russians argued for immediate restoration of 
capital punishment (FOM, 1997b).  
 
In 2000, public support for the death penalty in Russia 
increased according to the study by VCIOM. Based on VCIOM data, 
73% of all respondents favored capital punishment (VCIOM, 2000). 
The proportions of death penalty supporters were highest among 
respondents over 45 and those with less than a college degree 
(VCIOM, 2000). In 2001, VCIOM reported another increase in public 
support of capital punishment in Russia. According to their study, in 
2001, 79% of all Russians believed that some heinous crimes in Russia 
should be punishable by death (VCIOM, 2001). The study by FOM, also 
conducted in 2001, corroborates these findings, showing that 63% 
believed that the moratorium on the death penalty should be revoked 
(FOM, 2001a). 
Conducted in 2002, a study by VCIOM showed further growth in 
public support for the death penalty in Russia. According to this study, 
82% of all respondents agreed that the death penalty should be 
restored (VCIOM, 2002). In a study by the Russian Public Opinion 
Research Group (ROMIR), 57.9% of all respondents were in favor of 
lifting the moratorium on the death penalty in Russia (2005a). The 
most recent studies by leading research centers show that public 
support for the death penalty in Russia remains strong. Data by FOM 
(2006) indicates that 74% of all respondents consider the death 
penalty an appropriate measure of social control and punishment. 
Finally, a study by Levada in 2007 shows that only 17% of all Russians 
believe that the death penalty is morally unacceptable (Levada, 2007). 
This number is much higher (36%) for users of the Internet, who tend 
to be younger and more educated than the general population (RuNet, 
2008).  
 
Differences observed over the years by the different polling 
companies can be, to a certain degree, attributed to differences in the 
questionnaire methodology used in each study. For a better 
understanding of the questionnaires used to assess public attitudes on 
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the death penalty in Russia, we provide a summary in English 
translation of the questions used by the various surveyors. None of the 
surveys provided respondents with questions on life imprisonment as 
an alternative to capital punishment. Please see Appendix 2 for details. 
Notwithstanding the observed differences, the public polls suggest 
that, despite the major changes in both political and economic systems 
of the former Soviet Union, public approval of the death penalty 
remains strong and stable.  
 
4.2. Russian Duma  
 
The opinion of the State Duma, the lower chamber of the 
Russian parliament, concurs with public opinion on the death penalty 
(Zveyagin, 1997). Since 1996, the Duma made every effort to avoid 
the de jure abolition of the death penalty in Russia despite continuous 
and strong pressure from the Russian President. The Duma defeated 
both bills to abolish the death penalty in 1997 and the legislative 
moratorium on the death penalty in 1999. On February 15, 2002, the 
Duma adopted a declaration addressed to the President of Russia 
expressing serious concerns over a possible abolition of the death 
penalty in Russia in a situation of rising crime rates. It stated that the 
abolition would contradict the repeatedly expressed popular will and 
would make Russian people feel insecure and abandoned.54  
 
Only minority liberal parties that had never dominated the 
Russian legislative body favored abolition and attempted to ratify 
Protocol No. 6 (Pristavkin, 2004). Some researchers believe that the 
Duma’s reluctance to abolish the death penalty in Russia is due to fear 
of adopting an unpopular law (Mikhlin, 2000). The Duma’s approval 
ratings over the last ten years has remained very low (VCIOM, 2008). 
According to most polls, the Duma is one of the least popular and least 
trusted political institutions in Russia (FOM, 2000).55 Some other 
researchers speculate that the Duma's actions represent the personal 
views of the Duma members along with the instrumental views of their 
parties (Mitroshenkov, 2004).56 With the overwhelming public support 
for the pro-presidential "United Russia" party57 and its victory in the 
last Duma's election, it is unclear whether the current Duma is still 
concerned with aligning its position on the death penalty with general 
public opinion (Gadjiev, 2008). It is possible to suggest that the 
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current Duma may change their opinion on the death penalty abolition 
to align their views with Prime Minister Putin, who plays a critical role 
in the party's public success.  
 
4.3. The President  
 
Unlike the public and the State Duma, both presidents Yeltsin 
and Putin of Russia58 can be considered supporters of the abolition of 
the death penalty. President Yeltsin championed the idea of death 
penalty abolition by applying to the Council of Europe in 1992 in an 
effort to integrate Russia into the European community (Ritter, 2000). 
President Putin continued this line of foreign policy by creating the 
conditions for the de facto abolition of the death penalty in Russia. 59 
Putin urged the State Duma to confirm international obligations taken 
on by Russia as a result of signing Protocol No. 6 in 1997.  
 
Paradoxically, survey results confirm that the popular image of 
the Russian Presidents did not suffer from their unpopular views on 
abolition. In the study by FOM (FOM, 2001b), 55% of respondents 
reported that they were aware of the presidential idea to abolish the 
death penalty, and 60% of respondents said they disapproved. At the 
same time, the study conducted by ROMIR (2005b) suggests that the 
President remains the most trusted political figure in Russia.60 A 
possible explanation for this paradox was reflected in interviews 
conducted by FOM in 2001. According to FOM’s data, people in Russia 
believe that the official position of the Russian President is just a 
tribute to the European community, and that he is forced to hold these 
views under the pressure of current foreign policy (FOM, 2001b). 
Interviews conducted by FOM in conjunction with the survey showed 
that people believe that the abolition of the death penalty is an alien 
Western idea that was imposed on Russia due to its weak political and 
economic position in the world. For that reason, they “forgive” the 
President and believe that once Russia becomes politically stronger, 
the head of state will no longer seek to abolish the death penalty 
(FOM, 2001b).  
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5. Summary and Conclusions: The Way Ahead  
 
When speculating over the potential number of death penalty 
executions that could take place in Russia if the death penalty were 
restored, one should probably rely on current statistics on murder 
convictions. The CC of Russia adopted in 1996 lists only two major 
categories of capital offence – crimes against the state and aggravated 
murder. Studies on the death penalty in the last two decades of Soviet 
Union's history show that over 90% of all people executed were 
offenders convicted on the charge of aggravated murder (Mikhlin, 
2000). The number of people who were executed for crimes against 
the state diminished by the mid-1980s and remained insignificant 
(Duyunov, 2000; Turetskyi, 1985). Currently, such offenders receive 
life imprisonment terms as the only constitutionally allowable 
substitution for the death penalty (Kuznetsov, 2002). Official statistics 
from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Department of the 
Supreme Court show that, for the last five years, the number of people 
annually sentenced to life imprisonment in Russia for aggravated 
murder range from 45 to 96.61 Assuming that the number of crimes 
against the state will not increase dramatically, it is safe to suggest 
that if Russia were to resume death penalty executions, they might 
apply to dozens of offenders annually.  
 
The promise of the eventual abolition of capital punishment in 
Russia has kept Russia in the hunt for eventual membership in the 
European Community. Whatever happens after 2010, public opinion 
will not likely be the determining factor. Throughout Europe and the 
U.S., abolition has not been grounded in public opposition to capital 
punishment. If Russia resumes executions, even at a low level, CE 
membership will be forfeited. Even if de facto abolition is maintained, 
membership is unlikely. Finally, should Russia resume wholesale 
executions it will find a kindred soul in the Peoples’ Republic of China 
(the PRC), its large and influential neighbor in the East.  
 
The Soviet Union and Russia have a long tradition of frequent 
executions. Yet for over 100 years there has existed a slender reed of 
Russian abolitionist thought. As in other settings, symbolic, unenforced 
law in Russia serves the age-old goal of attempting to bridge the gap 
between incompatible parties. Frequent executions would incite an 
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adamant official response from the EC and make membership 
impossible while outright abolition would antagonize Russian citizens 
since. We have demonstrated conclusively that Russian opinion polls 
show solid support for the death penalty. On the other hand it must be 
said that this public opinion is not totally unlike that found in Western 
Europe, which has no capital punishment laws.  
 
Yet public opinion is where the similarities between Russian and 
Western Europe end. In the past the Russian Duma seemed to be 
afraid to contradict public opinion and thus overwhelmingly supported 
the death penalty. However, in the recent election the pro-Presidential 
party of United Russia took over the Duma, which suggests that 
current Duma may reverse their opinion regarding support of the 
death penalty and align with the presidential position. The Duma 
remains very unpopular with the Russian electorate, even though the 
United Russia party has a strong public support. Recent Russian 
presidents Yeltsin and Putin, seem totally committed to improving the 
external relations of Russia with the West and hope for eventual 
integration into the EC. Such membership would facilitate trade 
relations and likely ease international tensions. The President alone 
has the legal authority to offer clemency to all who are sentenced to 
death and has pushed for the abolition of the death penalty. The 
President remains a very popular institution even with this support for 
abolition. The Russian public can have it both ways; they support the 
death penalty but also support a President who does not. Complicating 
matters further the Constitutional Court of Russia has ruled that no 
capital trials can occur without juries and yet juries will not be 
established throughout all regions of Russia until 2010. How long this 
stalemate will last, no one can predict. In Hong Kong local courts for 
several decades continued to sentence convicted murderers to death 
and complained bitterly about British interference with executions 
(Gaylord & Galliher 1994). This situation changed once unification with 
the PRC neared. Now Hong Kong politicians determined that formal 
abolition was superior to the threat of wholesale executions at the 
hands of the PRC. It may be that the Russian Duma will behave 
similarly after 2010 when Russian executions will again become a legal 
reality. 
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Appendix 1. Chronological list of important legislative acts related to the 
death penalty in post-tsarist and Soviet Russia, 1917-1991 
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Appendix 2. Summary of questionnaires on death penalty cited in this 
study  
 
Study by FOM (1989). The majority of Russians are still against 
the death penalty abolition  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Как вы считаете, смертную казнь следует отменить или расширить ее 
применение?  
Следует отменить (или постепенно идти к ее отмене)  
Следует оставить (или даже расширить применение смертной казни)  
 
Author's English translation:  
Do you think that the death penalty should be abolished or should be 
expanded?  
Should be abolished (or gradually abolished)  
Should remain (or gradually increase) the use of the death penalty  
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Study by FOM (1997). The Russians and the Jail  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Как вы думаете, следует ли в России отменить смертную казнь?  
Да/нет  
 
Author's English translation:  
Do you think that Russia should abolish the death penalty?  
Yes/no  
 
Study by FOM (1997). About death penalty  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
В 1996 призидент Росии принял решение о введение моратория на 
сметрную казнь в Росии. Как вы относитесь к этому решению - одобряете 
его или нет?  
Одобряю/ Не одобряю/Затрудняюсь ответить  
 
Author's English translation:  
In 1996, the President of Russia made a decision to place a moratorium on 
death penalty in Russia. How do you feel about this decision?  
Approve /Disapprove /Don't know  
 
Study by VCIOM (2000). All-Russian survey. Item # 57_K  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
В какой мере Вы согласны или не согласны что смертная казнь должна 
быть отменена?  
соврешенно согласен/ скорее согласен/ скорее не согласен/ совршенно не 
согласен  
 
Author's English translation:  
To what degree to do you agree or disagree that the death penalty should be 
abolished?  
completely agree/ somewhat agree/ somewhat disagree/ completely disagree  
 
Study by FOM (2001) About the moratorium on the death 
penalty  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Уже около пяти лет Россия соблюдает мораторий на исполнение смертных 
приговоров. Судя по нашим данным, осведомлены об этом 68% россиян. 
Как же следует поступать в дальнейшем?  
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привести в исполнение смертные приговоры  
не приводить вынесенные смертные приговоры в исполнение (соблюдать 
мораторий)  
вообще отменить смертную казнь  
 
Author's English translation:  
For about five years now, Russia has been complying with the moratorium on 
death penalty executions. According to our data, 68% of all Russians know 
about it. What should we do next?  
Execute offenders that are sentenced to death  
Don't execute offenders that are sentenced to death according to moratorium 
(comply with the moratorium)  
Abolish the death penalty completely  
 
Study by VCIOM (2001). All-Russian survey. Item # 36  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Как Вы думаете должна ли существовать в России смертная казнь за 
тяжкие уголовные преступления?  
Да/ нет  
 
Author's English translation:  
What do you think, should Russia have the death penalty for heinous 
(serious) crimes?  
Yes/no  
 
Study by VCIOM (2002). All-Russian survey. Item # 47  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Как Вы думаете должна ли в нашей стране существовать смертная казнь?  
Да/ нет  
 
Author's English translation:  
What do you think, should our country have death penalty?  
Yes/no  
 
Study by ROMIR (2005). The attitude towards the death 
penalty  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Как Вы относитесь к смертной казни?  
Мораторий на смертную казнь надо отменить  
Смертная казнь недопустима  
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Затрудняюсь ответить  
 
Author's English translation:  
How do you feel about death penalty?  
Moratorium should be lifted  
Death penalty is unacceptable  
Don't know  
 
Study by FOM (2006). About death penalty  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
По вашему мнению, в принципе допустимо или недопустимо 
приговаривать преступников к смертной казни?  
допустимо/ не допустимо/ не знаю  
 
Author's English translation:  
In your opinion, as a matter of principle, is it acceptable or not to sentence 
offenders to death?  
acceptable/ unacceptable/ don't know  
 
Study by Levada (2007) The moral acceptability of different 
behavior and Study by RuNet (2008). The survey of Russian 
Internet  
 
Exact Russian wording:  
Пожалуйста, скажите, вы считаете морально приемлемым или морально 
неприемлемым смертную казнь?  
морально приемлимо/ морально неприемлимо  
 
Author's English translation:  
Do you think that death penalty is morally acceptable, or not?  
morally acceptable/ morally unacceptable 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 - The Constitutional Court of Russia is the highest judicial institution, 
created for the sole purpose of enforcing the principles of the Russian 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court does not try any criminal or civil 
cases, but only reviews the situations when the existing laws are in 
possible violation of the Constitution.  
2 For example, mass executions were ordered for the crimes of treason and 
abstraction of religion in 1069, 1071 and 1157 (Budzinskyi, 1870; 
Tagantsev, 1912; Zagoskin, 1892).  
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3 -The death penalty was originally mentioned for the crimes of triple theft in 
Dvin’s Charter (Dvinskaya Gramota) adopted in 1398; the Pskov Court 
Charter (Pskovskaya Sudnaya Gramota) issued in 1457 allowed the 
death penalty for four new crimes, including a treason, arson, theft 
from a church, and a theft of a horse; the Moscow Sudebniki of 1497 
and 1550 introduced the death penalty for all crimes against the Grand 
Prince and the state.  
4 -According to some historians, one of the most massive death penalty 
executions was conducted by Peter the Great in 1698 for the treason 
of 2000 men who participated in the Streltsy Uprising (Mouchnik, 
2006). The historians also estimate that Ivan the Terrible executed 
over 4000 people during his reign and tsar Alexei Mikhailovitch 
executed over 7000 people (Shargorodkyi, 1957).  
5 -Articles 209 and 210 of the Nakaz, cited from Feldstein (1909).  
6 -The first two Dumas were predominantly comprised of the representatives 
of the socialist, liberal and centrist parties. The third Duma had a 
much larger proportion of right-wing and conservative representatives.  
7 - In February of 1917, Russia experienced a democratic liberal revolution 
that was led by the middle-class intellectuals (named 
“intellegentsiya”). The Provisional government was formed after the 
revolution of February, 1917 and was replaced by the Bolshevik 
government in October of 1917.  
8 - Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii rabochego i krestyanskogo 
pravitel’stva RSFSR [The collection of statutes and regulations issued 
by the Factory and Peasant Government of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Republic] (henceforth cited as SU RSFSR), #1, article 10  
9 - The Revolutionary People’s Courts were the first trial criminal courts, 
organized by the Bolshevik government. Unlike the “Emergency 
Commissions”, the People’s Courts were considered a judicial agency 
and were instructed to follow the provisions of the criminal 
proceedings.  
10 - SU RSFSR, # 65, article 710  
11 - The name “White Guard” refers to the imperial troops in Russia that did 
not accept the Bolshevik revolution and were fighting to restore the 
tsarist regime during the civil war of 1917-1919. The term “white” is 
contrasted with the term “red” that was often used by the Bolshevik 
military organization (e.g. Red Army).  
12 -According to Tagantsev (1912), between 1866 and 1890, 134 people were 
sentenced to the death penalty and 44 of them were executed.  
13 -The Decree “About abolishing the highest measure of punishment 
(shooting)” was adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee and Council of People’s Commissars (SU RSFSR, # 4-5, 
article 22).  
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14 - The New Economic Policy, also known as NEP, was a temporal 
liberalization of the state control policy over the market that was 
conducted in order to improve the overall economic situation in Russia 
after WWI and the civil war of 1917-1919.  
15 -The two drafts did not have identical opinions on the death penalty. The 
draft by the Narkomyust allowed the use of the death penalty in 
territories where the state of emergency was declared. The Institute of 
Soviet Law advocated full abolition of the death penalty by the Soviet 
state.  
16 -The crimes of murder and rape were not considered capital offences. The 
emphasis on the state interest is another legal tradition that was 
started by the CC of 1922 and continued through the entire Soviet 
period.  
17 - Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was used as an official title 
for Russia during the time when it was a part of the Soviet Union 
(1923-1991).  
18 - According to Krylenko (1934), 7.6% of all crimes in the Criminal Code of 
RSFSR of 1922 were punishable by death penalty. In the Criminal 
Code of RSFSR of 1926 only 3.4% of all crimes were considered capital 
offences.  
19 - Article 21 of the Criminal Code of 1926, cited from Belyaev and 
Shargorodskyi (1970).  
20 - Sobranie zakonodatel’stva [ The code of laws] (henceforth cited SZ), 
(1929), #76, article 732.  
21 - SZ, (1932) # 62, article 350.  
22 - Included in the CC of RSFSR of 1926 by the Statute on Crimes against the 
State (SZ, 33, article 255).  
23 -The principle of analogy, which allows the courts to use criminal law on 
their own discretion in situations that are similar to the situation 
described in the code, was originally introduced by the CC of 1922. It 
sparked a lot of debates and contradiction, but was not widely 
employed until the penal repressions of the late 1920s and 1930s. The 
use of the principle of analogy significantly diminished after the 
Stalin's death and was banned by the CC of 1960.  
24 - Vedomosti Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR [The bulletin of the Supreme 
Counsel of USSR], (hence force cited as VVS SSSR), 1947, # 17.  
25 - “Krushcev thaw” is a period of temporal political liberalization that 
occurred while Nikita Khrushchev was appointed the Head of the 
Communist Party and the state. The Khrushchev campaign was 
intended to debunk the cult of personality developed by Stalin and 
provide some restrictions over the political oppressions.  
26 - Some Soviet and Russian jurists supported the death penalty from 
traditional standpoints: they argued that the death penalty reduces 
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homicide crime rates, restores social fairness in the society, and is the 
most effective measure of general deterrence (Galiakbarov, 1997; 
Mikhlin, 1997). Other jurists had more practical arguments including 
the fact that poor prison conditions in Russia would make the life 
sentence "more inhumane" than the death penalty itself (Boikov, 
1999). At the same time, several leading legal scholar advocated the 
abolition of the death penalty, suggesting that this was a legal trend 
within all democratic societies that Russia should also follow 
(Petrukhin, 1999). For details on the important legislative acts adopted 
in relation to the death penalty during 1917-1991, please refer to 
Appendix 1.  
27 - See Supra note # 35  
28 -He made his estimation based on the fact that 640,000 people were 
executed in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1954.  
29 - The information for this section was acquired from several sources. The 
texts of historic legal documents were taken primarily from the official 
sources on Soviet legislation, which include the Collection of Statutes 
and Regulations issued by the Factory and Peasant Government of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Republic, the Collection of Statues of the 
USSR, and the Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The 
current Russian legislative documents and court decisions were 
provided by the official online depositary of all Russian legislation run 
by a private company, “Consultant.”  
30 - “New democrats” is a label used for political groups and parties organized 
in the early 1990s as a result of the democratic changes and 
transformations occurring in the Soviet Union. The new democrats 
were ideologically juxtaposed to the conservative communist party. 
Later, the new democrats split into different political groups and 
branches including the current ruling centrist party.  
31 - Such a conclusion can be drawn based on the language of Opinion # 193 
by the PACE adopted on 01.25.1996. This document states in Article 
10 that “The Russian Federation shares fully its understanding and 
interpretation of commitments entered into as spelt out in paragraph 
7, and intends:… to sign within one year and ratify within three years 
from the time of accession Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights on the abolition of the death penalty in time of 
peace, and to put into place a moratorium on executions with effect 
from the day of accession”. Cited from http://assembly.coe.int  
32 - Retrieved from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08.  
33 - According to the recollections by Pristavkin (2004), one out of seven 
representatives in the Duma voted for the moratorium, but the 
Communist party strongly opposed such a decision.  
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34 - According to the CC of Russia of 1996, the following crimes are 
considered capital offices: murder with aggravating circumstances, 
attempted assassination against the state or a public figure, attempt 
on the life of a person administering justice or preliminary 
investigations, attempt on the life of a law-enforcement officer, and 
genocide (Articles 105 (2), 277, 295, 317, and 357 of the CC of 
Russia).  
35 - Par. 3 Article 58 of the CC of Russia of 1996. English translation is cited 
from Barry (1997).  
36 - See Article 89, par. C of the Constitution of Russia of 1993. Retrieved 
from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
37 - Clemency Commission is an advisory body to the President of Russian 
Federation. It was created in 1991 in order to assist the President with 
the decisions of pardon for criminal defendants. The Clemency 
Commission was dismissed after 1999, when the Constitutional Court 
of Russia temporary banned the death penalty executions. For more 
information on the functioning of the Clemency Commission please see 
Mikhlin (2000).  
38 - Par. 4 Article 184 of the CEC of Russia of 1997. The text of the CEC of 
Russia was retrieved from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
39 - This abolition is sometimes called “partial” since under the law of 1997 the 
possibility of the execution still exists for the defendants who choose 
not to apply for the Presidential clemency  
40 - Cited from Report # 7746 “Honouring of the commitment entered into by 
Russia upon accession to the Council of Europe to put into place a 
moratorium on executions of the death penalty” adopted by PACE on 
01.28.97. Retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int on 4.23.08 
41 - Cited from Resolution # 1111 “Honouring of the commitment entered into 
by Russia upon accession to the Council of Europe to put into place a 
moratorium on executions of the death penalty” adopted by PACE on 
01.29.97. Retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int on 4.23.08  
42 - The Draft of the Bill # 97803716-2 was introduced to the Duma on 
December 20, 1997. Retrieved from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
43 - The explanatory note to the draft of the bill # 97803716-2. Retrieved 
from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
44 - Amendments were introduced by Statute # 11-FZ on 01.08.98. Retrieved 
from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
45 - The draft # 99077736-2 was introduced to the State Duma on 
08.06.1999. Retrieved from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
46 - See Supra Note # 1  
47 - The Constitutional Court Ruling # 3-P “About the review of the 
constitutionality of articles 41 and 42 of the CPC of RSFRS, and 
provisions 1 and 2 of the Decree of Supreme Council adopted on 
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07.16.93 “About coming into the effect for the “Statute on court 
system”, the CPC of RSFSR, the CC of RSFSR and the AC of RSFSR 
according with complaints of the citizens and by the inquiry of the 
Moscow city courts”, adopted on 02.02.1999. Retrieved from 
www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
48 - Article 30 of the CPC of Russia of 2001. Retrieved from www.consultant.ru 
on 04.23.08  
49 - Article 8, par 2 of Statute # 177-FZ “On the effect of the CPC of Russia of 
2001” adopted on 12.18.2001. Retrieved from www.consultant.ru on 
04.23.08  
50 - The amendment # 241-FZ to the Statute “On the effect of the CPC of 
Russia of 2001” was adopted on 12.27.2006. Retrieved from 
www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08  
51-The secondary data on public opinion about death penalty in Russia was 
available online from polling research companies such as VCIOM, FOM 
and ROMIR. VCIOM is a government research center created in the 
late 1980s. The data was retrieved from www.wciom.ru. FOM is an 
abbreviation for the Foundation of Public Opinion, an independent non-
profit research organization. The data was retrieved from www.fom.ru. 
ROMIR is an abbreviation for the Russian Public Opinion Research 
Group. It is an independent for-profit research organization. The data 
was retrieved from www.romir.ru. Levada is the last name of the 
director of the Levada Center. Henceforward, Levada Center research 
will be referred to in this paper as Levada. All companies use similar 
sampling methodology. A representative sample of the Russian 
population is drawn by the multistage random cluster sampling 
technique. The sampling process is usually conducted in five stages. 1) 
A list of regions within federal circuits is commonly used as a sampling 
frame for the first stage. Regions are weighted using population 
demographics consisting of: gender, age, professional occupation, 
average income, and proportion of rural to urban population. 
According to the Russian Constitution, the 86 regions are 
geographically grouped into the larger fractions called “federal 
circuits.” There are currently seven federal circuits in Russia. 2) In the 
second stage of sampling, the cities, towns, and villages are selected 
from the clustered regions. 3) In the third stage of sampling, the 
election districts are usually selected from the list of cities, towns, and 
villages. 4) In the fourth stage of sampling, households registered with 
each election district are selected. 5) In the fifth stage of sampling, 
individual respondents are selected within the households. In each of 
the three survey companies, the sampling selection varies by the 
number and type of stratification and selection methods used during 
each stage. However, for all data used for this paper, the sampling 
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error does not exceed 5%, which allows us to assert that the public 
opinion data are representative of the entire Russian Federation.  
52 - This conclusion is also supported by the content analysis of the Russian 
mass media. For example, according to a study conducted by Moscow 
Academy of MVD (Borovikova, 2002), 28.5% of all publications in the 
Russian newspapers are devoted to the death penalty. Within these 
publications, over 80% reflect support for the death penalty as the 
best method to deter offenders from committing heinous crimes.  
53 - Glasnost is one of the principles of democratic change declared in the late 
1980s by Gorbachev. It refers to the ideas of free press and 
information, in contrast to the control of information by the state used 
during the USSR period.  
54 - See State Duma Decree # 2483-III-GD issued on 02.15.2002. Retrieved 
from www.consultant.ru on 04.23.08.  
55 - For example, according to the study by FOM (2000), the State Duma was 
among top three least trustworthy institutions in Russia in 2000.  
56 - According to Mitroshenkov (2004), 70% of all public servants, including 
the representatives of the State Duma, believed that capital 
punishment in Russia should be restored.  
57 -United Russia is a pro-presidential centrist party that was created in 2000. 
At the Duma's election of 2007, United Russia received an 
overwhelming majority of the seats in the Duma. For the last two 
years, according to the VCIOM data (2008), United Russia's approval 
rating has ranged from 45% to 62%. This is compared to approval 
ratings of less than 10% for all the other political parties. Liberal 
parties like Yabloko, who supports the abolition of death penalty, 
consistently received 1% of popular approval for the last two years. 
The literature on the current public situation in Russia suggests that 
the high ratings for the "United Russia" are directly resulting from the 
public approval for Prime Minister Putin. Surprisingly, the high 
approval ratings for the majority party in Duma, do not translate into 
the increase of public support for the Duma itself (Gadjiev, 2008).  
58 - Here we are referring to presidents Yeltsin and Putin. As of now, the 
elected president Medvedev has not had a chance to express his 
opinion on the issue of death penalty abolition. However, his 
adherence to the public policy of president Putin allows us to suggest 
that Medvedev will remain a supporter of death penalty abolition, as 
did the presidents before him.  
59 - Here were are referring to the adoption of the new CC of Russia in 1996, 
the new CEC of Russia in 1997 and the amendment to the new CEC of 
Russia in 1998.  
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60 - In this study, 34% of respondents said that they trust the President, 
compared to only 8% who said they trust the government, and 4% 
who said they trust the State Duma.  
61 - The data is retrieved from http://www.sopcourt.ru and n 12.10.08. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
